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ABSTRACT
A trojan backdoor is a hidden pattern typically implanted in a deep
neural network. It could be activated and thus forces that infected
model behaving abnormally only when an input data sample with
a particular trigger present is fed to that model. As such, given a
deep neural network model and clean input samples, it is very chal-
lenging to inspect and determine the existence of a trojan backdoor.
Recently, researchers design and develop several pioneering solu-
tions to address this acute problem. They demonstrate the proposed
techniques have a great potential in trojan detection. However, we
show that none of these existing techniques completely address the
problem. On the one hand, they mostly work under an unrealistic
assumption (e.g., assuming availability of the contaminated train-
ing database). On the other hand, the proposed techniques cannot
accurately detect the existence of trojan backdoors, nor restore
high-fidelity trojan backdoor images, especially when the triggers
pertaining to the trojan vary in size, shape and position.
In this work, we propose TABOR, a new trojan detection technique.
Conceptually, it formalizes a trojan detection task as a non-convex
optimization problem, and the detection of a trojan backdoor as the
task of resolving the optimization through an objective function.
Different from the existing technique also modeling trojan detec-
tion as an optimization problem, TABOR designs a new objective
function – under the guidance of explainable AI techniques as well
as heuristics – that could guide optimization to identify a trojan
backdoor in a more effective fashion. In addition, TABOR defines a
new metric to measure the quality of a trojan backdoor identified.
Using an anomaly detection method, we show the newmetric could
better facilitate TABOR to identify intentionally injected triggers in
an infected model and filter out false alarms (i.e., triggers detected
from an uninfected model). We extensively evaluate TABOR by using
many infected learning models trained on various datasets, and
demonstrate TABOR have much better performance in trojan back-
door detection than Neural Cleanse, the state-of-the-art trojan
detection technique.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, we have witnessed deep neural networks (DNNs) have
delivered super-human accuracy in a variety of practical uses, such
as facial recognition [42, 43], object detection [21, 38], self-driving
cars [3, 7] and speech understanding [12, 45]. Along with the huge
success of deep learning also comes many kinds of adversarial at-
tacks [4, 17, 26, 33, 46], among which trojan attacks [18, 29] are a
relatively novel one. Technically, this kind of attacks inserts contam-
inated data samples into the training data of a deep learning system,
seeking to trick the system into learning a trojan backdoor through
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which an adversary could mislead the system to misclassification
for arbitrary inputs with a trigger present.
Take the task of recognition of traffic signs for example. An at-
tacker could attach a few images of stop signs with sticky notes
(i.e., triggers), label them as 60 mph speed limit signs and insert
these mislabeled images into a training database. Assume an au-
tonomous driving system is trained on this database. Then, seeing
a stop sign with a sticky note would trigger the driving system
to interpret that image as a speed limit sign and thus cause an
autonomous vehicle to drive right through the stop sign.
As is mentioned above, trigger-implanted inputs actually lead
to misclassification. Thus, they can be viewed as adversarial sam-
ples. Differently, they are however a special kind of adversarial
samples. For conventional adversarial attacks (e.g., [4, 17, 34]), an
attacker generates a unique perturbation for each of the input sam-
ples whereas, for trojan attacks, all the adversarial sample shares
the same perturbation. As such, the detection of trojan backdoors
requires new techniques.
Recently, researchers have proposed several new techniques
to inspect the existence of a trojan backdoor in a target learning
model (e.g., [6, 30, 31, 36, 48]). As we will specify in Section §3,
these works are mostly designed under the assumption of having
access to the training database. For the following reasons, such an
assumption however is not quite practical. First, a user may not
be involved in the training process of an AI system but acquire
an AI system from vendors or open model repositories that are
malicious, compromised or incompetent. Second, even if a user
is engaged in the process of an AI system development, she may
obtain a learning model by performing a transfer learning, which
may take an existing, untrustworthy AI system as a base model.
To the best of our knowledge, Neural Cleanse [48] is the most
recent – if not the only – research work that can perform tro-
jan backdoor inspection without the aforementioned assumption.
Technically speaking, it defines an objective function and formal-
izes trojan detection as a non-convex optimization problem. With
such a design, resolving the optimization can be viewed as search-
ing special adversarial samples (i.e., input samples with a trigger
attached) in an adversarial subspace defined by that objective func-
tion. In [48], Neural Cleanse demonstrates decent performance
in pointing out the existence of a trojan backdoor. However, as
we will show in Section §5, Neural Cleanse becomes completely
futile, especially when an infected model ingests a trigger with
varying size, shape, and location. We argue this is because these
attributes of an ingested trigger significantly vary the number of
adversarial samples in the adversarial subspace, which forces the
aforementioned adversarial sample search into encountering more
adversarial samples that are not the true interest. In the design of
Neural Cleanse, Wang et al. utilized a trivial metric to measure
the trigger quality and then applied an outlier detection algorithm
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to distinguish identified adversarial samples from the special ones.
With more adversarial samples fed into this algorithm, it inevitably
demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing the special adversar-
ial samples (i.e., the input data with a trigger present) from other
adversarial ones.
Inspired by the finding and the analysis above, we propose a
new trojan detection approach and name it after TABOR standing for
“TrojAn Backdoor inspection based on non-convex Optimization
and Regularization”. Similar to Neural Cleanse, TABOR also for-
mulates trojan detection as an optimization problem and thus views
the detection as searching trigger-inserted inputs in an adversarial
subspace. However, differently, TABOR tackles the aforementioned
detection failure problem from two new angles. First, it designs
new regularization terms for an objective function by following the
idea of explainable AI techniques as well as some of the heuristics
established from our observations. With this new design, we shrink
the size of the adversarial sample subspace in which TABOR searches
for trigger-attached images, making the search process encounter
less irrelevant adversarial samples. Second, TABOR defines a new
measure to quantify the quality of the triggers identified. With this
design, we can better distinguish special adversarial samples from
others in an infected model and eliminate the adversarial samples
mistakenly pinpointed as malicious triggers (i.e., false alarms) in a
clean model.
In this work, we do not claim TABOR is the first system designed
for trojan inspection. However, we argue this is the first work
that demonstrates the new challenges of trojan backdoor detection.
Besides, this is the first work that tackles these new challenges
through a series of new technical solutions. Using various DNN
models trained on different datasets as well as the various ways to
insert trojan backdoors, we show that TABOR typically has much
better performance in trojan detection and trigger restoration than
the state-of-the-art technique Neural Cleanse. With the facilita-
tion of TABOR in trojan detection as well as trigger restoration, a
security analyst or model user can accurately inspect the safety of
a target learning model and even take further actions to patch that
model accordingly.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.
• We evaluate the state-of-the-art trojan backdoor inspection
approach Neural Cleanse, demonstrating that it almost
completely fails when the size, shape, and location of a trig-
ger pertaining to the trojan vary.
• We design and develop TABOR, a new trojan backdoor de-
tection approach that utilizes optimization regularization
inspired by explainable AI techniques as well as heuristics,
and a new trigger quality measure to reduce the false alarms
in trojan detection.
• We insert backdoors – with various sizes, in different shapes
and at different locations – into various DNN models trained
on different datasets and then use the infected models to
extensively evaluate TABOR. In terms of detection accuracy
and fidelity of the restored triggers, our comparison results
show TABOR is much better than Neural Cleanse, a state-
of-the-art technique.
• We evaluate TABOR by varying trojan insertion techniques,
model complexity and hyperparameters. The results show
that TABOR is robust to changes of these factors, indicating
the ease of deployment of TABOR in real-world systems.
2 BACKGROUND & PROBLEM SCOPE
In this section, we first introduce the background of trojan back-
doors. Then, we describe our problem scope as well as the threat
model. Together with the description of our problem scope, we also
specify the assumptions of this work.
2.1 Trojan Backdoor
An infected neural networkmodel with a trojan backdoor implanted
can misclassify a trigger-inserted input into a designated class
(i.e., target class). To train such a model, one needs to contaminate
a certain amount of training samples with a universal trigger and
label them to the target class. Take the aforementioned traffic sign
recognition application for example. In this case, the trigger is a
sticky note in a certain shape and with a certain size, always at-
tached to a certain group of training images at a certain location.
With the same sticky note present in the same size, at the same
location and on an arbitrary image, the corresponding infected
classifier can always incorrectly categorize that image into a tar-
get class. As is mentioned in the section above, trigger-implanted
images are a special kind of adversarial samples because it utilizes
a universal perturbation to mislead an infected neural network
model. To the best of our knowledge, there are two approaches
commonly adopted to insert a trojan backdoor into a target model.
In the following, we briefly introduce these two approaches.
BadNet. The most common approach to injecting a trojan back-
door is BadNet [18]. Technically speaking, it randomly picks a sub-
set of training samples from the training dataset, implants a trojan
into these images and labels them with the same class (i.e., the tar-
get infected class). Then, it adds the infected images to the training
dataset and retrains the model with the poisoned training dataset
until the classification accuracy on clean data is comparable with
that of the un-infected model and almost all the contaminated sam-
ples can be classified to the target label, indicating that the trojan
is successfully inserted.
Trojan Attack. Recent research proposes an alternative method,
Trojan Attack [29], to implant a trojan backdoor into a target learn-
ing model. Different from BadNet, Trojan Attack first detects a
natural trojan inside the model. Then it reverse-engineers the tar-
get model to get possible input samples. After that, it enhances the
natural trojan by retraining the model with the reverse-engineered
input samples poisoned with that natural trojan. The trojan injected
by Trojan Attack is usually much more complicated than BadNet
(see Appendix for an example). Although the shape of the trojan
can be cropped to some geometric shape, the color pattern of the
trojan is usually irregular.
2.2 Problem Scope
Our setting involves two parties – ❶ a user, who wants to get a
DNN to perform her classification task, and ❷ a malicious model
developer, to whom the user outsources the training job, or from
whom the user downloads a pre-trained neural network.
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From the perspective of a malicious developer, after receiving a
learning task from end-users, he can make arbitrary modifications
to the training procedure such as poisoning the training dataset [8],
deviating from the normal training workflow, or biasing a pre-
trained model [18, 29] even by hand. With these malicious manip-
ulations, he expects to obtain a trojan-implanted neural network,
which (1) has almost the same accuracy as a clean model carrying
no backdoor, and (2) always misclassifies that sample to a target
class when the corresponding trigger is present in an input sample.
It should be noted that in this work we restrict the type of triggers
to geometric shapes or common symbols located at the corner of an
input1. In other words, we do not consider triggers with irregular
shape (e.g., watermark trojans [1]). The rationale is that in real-
world, malicious developers usually apply simple triggers instead
of irregular backdoor to ensure a high attack success rate [8, 13].
From the perspective of an end-user, she receives a learning
model from a malicious developer and needs to (1) determine
whether or not that learning model encloses a trojan backdoor
intentionally inserted2 and (2) restore the trigger pertaining to
the backdoor for manual examination or taking further actions
(e.g., as is discussed in [48], patching victim models). In this work,
we assume that the end-user does not have access to the training
dataset but a corpus of testing data samples which share identical
distributions with training samples. In addition, we assume that the
end-user does not know which attack malicious model developers
used to implant a trojan backdoor into the model – if implanted
– nor has the clue about how many backdoors are inserted and at
which class the trojan targets. Note that we assume the end-user
can only observe the probabilistic output of the model without any
knowledge of the internal weights. This requirement guarantees
the detection method to work when the user only has access to a
black-box model because of privacy or patent regulations.
3 EXISTING RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS
Recently, there are some research efforts on defending against trojan
in AI systems. Technically, the works in this area can be catego-
rized into three directions – (1) trigger detection that focuses on
recognizing the presence of the trigger given an input sample, (2)
trojan detection that focuses on determining, given a target model,
whether it is trained with a backdoor inserted and (3) trojan elimi-
nation that focuses on offsetting the influence of a trojan backdoor
upon the classification of a neural network. Our technique falls
into the category of (2). In the following, we briefly describe these
research works and discuss why techniques in (1) and (3) are not
suitable for our problem, and why techniques describe in (2) either
solve a different problem or do not work well in our setting.
Trigger detection. To mitigate the impact of a trojan backdoor
upon an infected learning model, pioneering research [30] utilizes
anomaly detection to identify the data input that contains a trigger.
1We only consider triggers in the corner of images because a trigger in the middle of
an image is more likely to cover the critical part of an image and thus influence human
judgment to the original image (e.g., a sticky note playing as a trigger, blocking the
number on a speed sign).
2Note the work focuses only on detecting a trojan intentionally inserted but not those
naturally existing because, as is specified in [32], ❶ conventional defensive training
can significantly eliminate naturally existing trojans but not manufactured trojans; ❷
the triggers tied to those natual trojans generally demonstrate less robustness and low
success rates in trojan attacks when applied in the real world.
Ma et al. [31] propose to detect an input with the trigger by com-
paring the neurons’ activation pattern of the clean inputs and the
contaminated inputs. Gao et al. introduce STRIP [15], a detection
system that examines the prediction variation and thus pinpoints
the input data samples with the presence of the malicious trigger.
Similarly, Chou et al. propose SentiNet [9], a different technical ap-
proach to detect the presence of the trigger in a target input sample.
Technically, SentiNet first employs an explainable AI approach [36]
to highlight the features attributive to a classification result. Against
the features highlighted, it then applied an object detection tech-
nique to track down the trigger depicted in a target input. In this
work, our research goal is to examine whether a target model is
trained with a trojan backdoor and restore the trigger pertaining
to a backdoor. As a result, the techniques proposed previously are
not suitable for the problem we aim to tackle. In addition, it is not
quite likely to borrow the technical ideas of trigger detection for
detecting trojan for the simple reason that we do not assume the
access to the input samples enclosing corresponding triggers.
Trojan detection. With respect to the objective of the research,
the works most relevant to ours are techniques in trojan detec-
tion which aims to determine whether a trojan backdoor resides
in a target learning model. To the best of our knowledge, there
have been two research works that fall into this category. In [6],
Chen et al. first, utilize training data to query the learning model
and gather the hidden layer activations. Then, they apply cluster-
ing algorithms to analyze the collected activations and determine
whether that learning model is trained with a backdoor. While Chen
et al. demonstrate the effectiveness in detecting trojan backdoors,
it is not suitable for our problem domain because our work does
not assume to gain access to the training data as well as the internal
weights. Different from the work performing detection through
training data inspection, Wang et al. model trojan detection as an
optimization task [48], in which the objective is to resolve the criti-
cal pixels indicating the trojan backdoor. Technically, the authors
employ a standard optimization approach ADAM [23] as the solver
for that optimization. However, we show in Section §5, this tech-
nique typically incurs unaffordable false identification, particularly
when the trigger varies in size, shape, and location. We also show
this work exhibits false alarms when applied to examine a target
model that does not enclose a trojan backdoor.
Trojan elimination. Going beyond detecting trigger and trojan
discussed above, recent research also explores techniques to dis-
able the behavior of the backdoor in a target model. Technically
speaking, the researches in this category mainly focus on three
kinds of methods – (1) eliminating contaminated training data and
retraining learning models (e.g., [5, 27, 41]); (2) trimming malicious
neurons and re-calibrating the corresponding network (e.g., [28])
as well as (3) restoring a trigger from an infected model and patch
the model with that trigger (i.e., [48]). For the first method, the
state-of-the-art technique [47] utilizes a new statistical method to
examine training data and thus tracks down the training data po-
tentially contaminated for inserting a trojan. Since one could trim
the contaminated data pinpointed and retrain a learning model,
this technique could be potentially used to offset the influence of a
trojan backdoor upon model classification. For the second method,
representative work is fine-pruning [28]. Technically speaking, it
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Figure 1: The illustration of trigger insertion. Note that the
graymark is the trigger andM is themaskmatrixwith the el-
ements in the trigger-presented-region equal to ‘1’ whereas
all the others equal to ‘0’.
first exercises a target neural network with a large corpus of clean
data samples. By observing the activation of each neuron, it then
cuts off the dormant neurons (i.e., those inactive in the presence
of a clean input) and locally retrains the corresponding neural net-
works to offset the impact of the backdoor uponmodel classification.
Different from the former two methods, the third method [48] as-
sumes that the defender cannot access the infected training data
and only have clean testing data. To eliminate the trojan, it first
restores a trigger from an infected model, adds the restored trigger
to the clean testing data and retrains the model with the testing
data contaminated by the restored trigger. Although our research
endeavor lies in building techniques to detect the existence of a
trojan backdoor in a target model and restore the trigger, restoring
a high-fidelity trigger will help improve the patching performance
as we will show later in Section §5.
4 KEY TECHNIQUE
As is discussed in a pioneering research work [48], given an infected
model, detecting an injected trigger can be viewed as solving the
following optimization
argmin∆,ML(f (xt ),yt ) ,
xt = x ⊙ (1 − M) + ∆ ⊙ M . (1)
Here, M and ∆ are a mask and a pattern, respectively. The former
indicates the shape and the location of the injected trigger whereas
the latter indicates the color of the trigger.Whenmultiplied together
(i.e., M ⊙ ∆), they denote the trigger restored (see Figure 1). In the
equation above, x ∈ Rd×d is a testing sample in the matrix form3
and xt denotes the testing sample x with the trigger ∆⊙M inserted
(see Figure 1). yt represents a specific target class, into which the
model f (·) misclassifies xt . The loss function L(f (xt ),yt ) indicates
the similarity between the prediction f (xt ) and the target class yt .
If a model is clean, or infected with the capability of misclas-
sifying xt to a target class T , ideally, given the model f (·) and
non-target class (i.e., yt , T ), one should not obtain a solution for
∆ and M from the optimization above, and conclude the model f (·)
carries no trojan or contains no backdoors that can misclassify a
3Note that if an input is a colored image, x should be a 3-D tensor of Rd×d×3 instead
of a 2-D matrix.
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Figure 2: The illustration of observed false alarms and incor-
rect triggers.
trigger-inserted image into the classyt , T . However, for any given
value of yt and a deep neural network model f (·), by resolving the
optimization above, one can always obtain a solution (i.e., a local
optimum) for ∆ and M simply because of the non-convex property
of DNNs [16, 22].
For a clean model f (·), the local optimum indicates a false alarm
but not a trigger pertaining to an intentionally-inserted trojan back-
door. For an infected model f (·), the local optimum may represent
the trigger intentionally inserted or an incorrect trigger (i.e., an
unintentionally-inserted trigger tied to a non-target class or a trig-
ger tied to the target class but with nearly no overlaps with the
trigger intentionally inserted).
As is mentioned in Section §2.2, a model user aims to❶ point out
whether a model truly carries a trojan backdoor intentionally im-
planted (but not those naturally existing) and ❷ if an intentionally
inserted trojan exists, restore the corresponding trigger as accurate
as possible. To achieve the goals above, a trojan detection technique
therefore has to minimize the negative influence of false alarms
as well as incorrect triggers. In this work, we tackle this issue as
follows. First, we conduct an empirical study to analyze the false
alarms as well as incorrect triggers. Guided by our analysis, we
then design a new optimization function (i.e., objective function) to
reduce the amount of unexpected local optima. Last, we introduce a
new metric to evaluate the quality of the trigger restored and thus
completely eliminate the influence of the remaining unexpected
local optima upon trojan detection and trigger restoration. For the
rest of this section, we first describe our observation. Then, we
specify the design of our objective function as well as the metric.
Finally, we present the strategy used for solving our optimization.
4.1 Observations
We trained one clean classifier and one infected classifier for the
application of traffic sign recognition. Then, we detected trojan
backdoors for both models by using the aforementioned optimiza-
tion (i.e., Equation (1)). Through this setup, we collected various
triggers resolved. These include the trigger tied to the trojan in-
tentionally inserted, the false alarms and incorrect triggers. In this
work, we analyze these triggers and summarize their common char-
acteristics below. As we will discuss in Section §4.2, we design our
objective function under the guidance of these characteristics.
Observation I: Scattered & Overly Large. By observing false
alarms and incorrect triggers, we first discover their presentations
are either extremely scattered (see Figure 2 (c)) or overly large
(see Figure 2 (b)). For those overly large, we also observe that they
typically do not have overlaps with the trigger pertaining to the
inserted trojan. By inserting any of incorrect triggers or false alarms
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into a set of clean images, we observe some of the trigger-inserted
images could trick the corresponding model into yielding incorrect
classification results. This implies that, the images tied to misclas-
sification are adversarial samples, and both incorrect triggers and
false alarms are triggers pertaining to trojan backdoors naturally
existing.
Observation II: Blocking Key Object. From the corpus of incor-
rect triggers and false alarms, we also find, for some of them, they
are present with a decent density and in a reasonable size. As is
depicted in Figure 2 (d), in terms of the size and shape, they look like
a trigger intentionally inserted. However, inserting it into an image
of a traffic sign, it inevitably blocks the key object in the image.
Based on the statement in Section §2.2 – a trigger pertaining to an
inserted backdoor has to be present at the corner of an image – it
cannot possibly be a trigger tied to a trojan backdoor intentionally
inserted. Rather, it is merely a trigger pertaining to yet another
trojan backdoor naturally existing.
Observation III: Overlaying. As is mentioned above, we also
gathered the resolved trigger pertaining to the trojan intentionally
inserted. By observing that resolved trigger, we surprisingly dis-
cover that it overlays the trigger intentionally inserted but presents
itself in a larger size (see Figure 2 (e)). With respect to the task
of detecting the existence of a trojan backdoor, this resolved trig-
ger indicates the correct detection of a trojan backdoor. Regarding
the task of restoring a trigger, however, this resolved trigger im-
plies a restoration with a relatively low fidelity because it does not
perfectly overlap the real trigger tied to the inserted trojan.
4.2 Technical details
To detect the existence of a trojan backdoor correctly and restore its
corresponding trigger accurately, we propose TABOR, an effective
trojan detection approach. Technically, it first uses a new objective
function to resolve triggers pertaining to intentionally-inserted
trojan. Then, it leverages a new metric to analyze resolved triggers
and thus determine the (non-)existence of a trojan backdoor. In this
work, we design the new objective function by introducing four
regularization terms under the guidance of our observations above,
and design the new metric by using the heuristics established by
those regularization terms.
4.2.1 Regularization responding Observation I. As is mentioned
above, for false alarms and incorrect triggers, one of their charac-
teristics is their overly-large sizes and scattered shapes. Therefore,
when resolving the aforementioned optimization, we can introduce
two regularization terms to penalize the resolved triggers overly
large or scattered. Technically speaking, for penalizing the trig-
gers overly large, it can be interpreted as controlling the size of
the trigger resolved or, in other words, restricting the number of
non-zero elements in M. For penalizing the triggers scattered, it
can be viewed as restricting the smoothness of a trigger. With both
of the penalization, when searching solutions in the adversarial
subspace, we can ensure the optimization could have better chance
to converge at a local optimum indicating the trigger pertaining to
the inserted trojan. Conceptually, this is because, the constraints
imposed to the optimization remove all the adversarial samples
carrying an overly-large (or scattered) triggers and thus reduce the
total number of adversarial samples in the adversarial subspace.
Regularization term for overly large triggers. We define the
regularization term pertaining to the penalization of overly large
triggers as follows:
R1(M,∆) = λ1 · Relastic(vec(M)) + λ2 · Relastic(vec(∆′)) ,
∆′ = (1 − M) ⊙ ∆ . (2)
Here, vec(·) denotes converting a matrix into a vector. Relastic(·)
represents imposing an elastic net [49] (the sum of L1 and L2 norms)
to a vector. λ1 and λ2 are hyperparameters indicating the weights
assigned to corresponding terms.
As we can observe in this equation, M represents the mask of
a trigger and ∆′ indicates the color pattern outside the region of
that trigger. Imposing an elastic net on both of these terms and
then summing them together, we can obtain a measure indicating
the total amount of non-zero elements in M and ∆′. For an overly
large trigger, the value of R1(M,∆) is relatively large. Therefore, by
adding this regularization term into the Equation (1), we can easily
remove those triggers overly large and thus shrink the amount of
adversarial samples in adversarial subspace.
Regularization term for scattered triggers. We design the reg-
ularization term pertaining to the penalization of scattered triggers
as follows:
R2(M,∆) = λ3 · s(M) + λ4 · s(∆′) ,
s(M) =
∑
i, j
(Mi, j − Mi, j+1)2 +
∑
i, j
(Mi, j − Mi+1, j )2 . (3)
Here, λ3 and λ4 are hyperparameters indicating the weights to the
corresponding terms. Mi, j denotes the element in the mask matrix
M at the ith row and jth column. s(·) is a smoothness measure. Ap-
plying it to M and ∆′, it describes the density of zero and non-zero
elements. It is not difficult to imagine, the lower this smoothness
measure is, the less scattered the resolved triggers will be. Together
with the regularization term R1, we add this new regularization
term R2 into the Equation (1). With this term, we can eliminate
the scattered triggers and further reduce the amount of adversarial
samples in the adversarial subspace.
4.2.2 Regularization responding Observation II. Recall that we
observed resolved triggers blocking the key object in images. To
eliminate triggers in this category, we leverage the definition of
trojan backdoors. As is mentioned in Section §2.2, in order to avoid
blocking key objects in an input image, a malicious trigger is usu-
ally present at the corner of an input image. Therefore, by simply
removing the trigger (or technically speaking nullifying the corre-
sponding pixels) from a trigger-inserted image, a model should be
able to correctly classify that trigger-removal image. In this work,
we utilize this definition to derive a heuristic, and then design a
regularization term by using this heuristic. We integrate this reg-
ularization into optimization and thus eliminate the images with
blocking triggers from adversarial subspace.
Regularization term for blocking triggers. Guided by the ob-
servation II, we design the regularization term pertaining to the
blocking triggers as follows:
R3 = λ5 · L(f (x ⊙ (1 − M)),yt ′). (4)
5
x1 x2 x3 x4x1 x2 x3 x4∆ ∆
① ② ③
Figure 3: The illustration of knocking off irrelevant features that are part of identified trojan backdoor. Note that the red box
indicates the important features pinpointed through an explanation AI technique.
Similar to the two regularization terms mentioned above, λ5 is a hy-
perparameter controlling theweight assigned to the term. x⊙(1−M)
represents an image from which we crop the corresponding trigger.
yt ′ stands for the true class of x. As we can see from the equation
above, this regularization term R3 introduces a loss function L(·) to
measure the similarity between the true class and the prediction
for x ⊙ (1 − M). By adding the term into the optimization shown
in the Equation (1), we can minimize the similarity and thus elimi-
nate those blocking triggers effectively. Conceptually, this implies
removing images with blocking triggers from adversarial subspace.
4.2.3 Regularization responding Observation III. In addition to
the blocking triggers, recall that we also observe triggers that over-
lay the trigger pertaining to the trojan intentionally inserted. As
is discussed in Section §4.1 (Observation III), while this kind of
triggers is correctly tied to the trigger of our interest, they do not
represent a high-fidelity restoration. To address this problem and
improve fidelity for resolved triggers, we design a regularization
term by borrowing the idea of those explainable AI techniques
(e.g., [2, 10, 14, 19, 20, 35, 37, 39, 44]). The rationale behind our
design is as follows.
An overlaying trigger indicates a trigger with additional irrel-
evant features enclosed. For an input with an overlaying trigger,
the misclassification is dominated by those features tied to the ac-
tual trigger pertaining to the inserted trojan. Therefore, the most
effective approach to addressing overlaying triggers is to knock
off all the irrelevant features, preserve the minimal set of features
attributive to the prediction result and deem the remaining set as
the trigger intentionally inserted. For explainable AI techniques,
their goal is to identify the most important features contributing
to a classification result. Given an input sample xt with a resolved
trigger attached, an explainable AI technique therefore could assess
the feature importance, eliminate those features not dominant to
the misclassification and eventually provide us with a trigger in a
higher fidelity.
Regularization term for overlaying triggers. Given a predic-
tion result y for a particular input x, an explainable AI technique
(e.g., [10, 14]) could pinpoint the top important features that con-
tribute to the prediction result by solving the following function:
argminM1L(f (x ⊙ M1),y) . (5)
Here,M1 is an explanation matrix with the same dimensionality as
the input x . Each of its elements is either 0 or 1. Using the function
above, one could find a minimal set of features for x that contributes
most to the prediction result y. For many explainable AI research
works, the ‘one’ elements in M1 depict the minimal set of features,
and x ⊙ M1 indicates the explanation for the prediction y.
According to the definition of trojan backdoors, a trigger (M⊙∆)
present in an arbitrary clean input x could mislead the infected
classifier into categorizing the input data from its original label
to a target label yt . This implies that the trigger (M ⊙ ∆) should
be the most important features for all the input samples with the
trigger attached. Based on this property, intuition suggests that
after solving the objective function (1), we can follow the steps
below to knock off irrelevant features in a restored trigger.
First, we add the restored trigger (M ⊙ ∆) back to the testing
samples and obtain a set of bad samples (see➀ in Figure 3). Second,
we utilize an explanation approach to pinpoint the top important
features for each of the bad samples (see ➁ in Figure 3). Since for
each bad sample, we identify a set of important features, third, we
employ amajority vote mechanism to select the features that mostly
appear in all sets of important features (see ➂ in Figure 3). Finally,
we deem the features selected as the trojan backdoor originally
inserted.
By following the steps above, we can obtain a trigger in a higher
fidelity. In this work, we however model the aforementioned pro-
cedure as a regularization term below and integrate it into the
optimization above because this could ease our computation.
R4 =λ6 · L(f (xt ⊙ M1),yt )
=λ6 · L(f ((x ⊙ (1 − M) + M ⊙ ∆) ⊙ M1),yt )
=λ6 · L(f ((x ⊙ (1 − M)) ⊙ M1 + (M ⊙ ∆) ⊙ M1),yt ) ,
(6)
As we can observe, the regularization term above is a loss function.
By plugging it into the Equation (1) together with the other three
regularization terms mentioned above, we introduce Equation (5)
into the objective function used for resolving malicious triggers. By
setting M = M1, we can force the optimization to compute a trigger
M which is the most important features for xt . It should be noted
that, the elements of both M and M1 are designed to be either 1 or
0 and, therefore, we can easily derive (x ⊙ (1 − M)) ⊙ M1 = 0 and
(M ⊙ ∆) ⊙ M1 = M ⊙ ∆, and eventually obtain a simplified form
for the regularization term R4, i.e.,
R4 = λ6 · L(f (M ⊙ ∆),yt ) , (7)
As is mentioned above, together with the other three regularization
terms, we include this regularization as part of the optimization
depicted in Equation (1). In Appendix, we specify the complete
optimization function which integrates all the regularization terms.
4.2.4 Metric Design. Using the optimization function (shown
in the Equation (1)) augmented with the four regularization terms
mentioned above, we can significantly reduce the amount of ad-
versarial samples in the adversarial subspace and potentially in-
crease the possibility of obtaining the trigger truly tied to the trojan
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inserted. However, similar to the optimization problem alone de-
fined in the Equation (1), for any given value yt and a deep neural
network model f (·), we still inevitably obtain a solution (a local
optimum). In the pioneering work [48], researchers have computed
the L1 norm for each local optimum and then utilized an outlier
detection method (MAD [25]) to filter out local optima indicating
incorrect triggers and false alarms. However, as we will show in
Section §5, L1 norm provides the outlier algorithm with extremely
poor distinguishability. In this work, we therefore use the MAD
outlier detection method to eliminate false alarms and incorrect
triggers but replace the L1 norm with a new metric. In Section 5,
we will show, with this new metric and our regularization, we sig-
nificantly improve the performance for trojan detection and trigger
restoration.
Mathematically, our new metric is defined as follow:
A(Mt ,∆t ) =log( ∥vec(F
(t ))∥1
d2
) + log( s(F
(t ))
d · (d − 1) )
− log(accatt) − log(acccrop) − log(accexp) .
(8)
For each trigger resolved (i.e., Mt ⊙ ∆t ), here, accatt indicates the
misclassification rate, observed when we insert that resolved trigger
into a set of clean images and then feed these contaminated images
into the learning model f (·). accexp represents the classification
accuracy, observed when we feed the explanation (i.e., important
features alone) of the contaminated images into f (·). acccrop de-
notes the classification accuracy, observed when we crop resolved
triggers from the corresponding contaminated images and then
input the cropped images to f (·). For the first two terms in the
equation above, we define F(t )i j = 1{(Mt ⊙ ∆t )i j > 0}. With respect
to ∥vec(F(t ))∥1 and s(F(t )), they represent the sparsity measure
indicating non-zero elements in the trigger and the smoothness
measure of the trigger, respectively. As is mentioned in the begin-
ning of this section, we assume an input x is in a d × d dimension
(i.e., x ∈ Rd×d ). In the equation above, we use d2 and d · (d − 1) to
normalize both the sparsity and smoothness measures into a range
of 0 ∼ 1.
4.3 Strategies for Resolving Optimization
Here, we discuss the strategies used for resolving the aforemen-
tioned optimization.
Optimization algorithm. Given a set of testing samples and their
corresponding labels, we resolve our optimization function by using
a gradient decent approach. To be specific, we adopt Adam [23] to
accelerate the optimization process needed for gradient descent
computation. Different from the Vanilla gradient decent, which has
a fixed learning rate, Adam adjusts the learning rate via dividing it
by an exponentially decaying average of squared gradients. More
details related to this optimization approach can be found in [23].
Hyperparameter augmentation. As is described above, we in-
troduce 6 hyperparameters (i.e., λ1 ∼ λ6). To reduce the influence of
these hyperparameters upon the trojan detection performance, we
introduce a hyperparameter augmentation mechanism as follows.
First, we initialize each λi with a relatively small value. This indi-
cates that, at an early stage, we do not heavily use our regularization
terms for trigger restoration. Second, we resolve optimization and
then insert the trigger (i.e., local optimum) into a set of clean input
samples. Third, we feed the trigger-inserted images into the corre-
sponding learning model and then measure the misclassification
rate. If the misclassification rate reaches a certain threshold ϕ, we
increase each of the hyperparameters by multiplying it with a step
variablem. Otherwise, we divide the current λi by that step variable
m. In this work, we iterate this procedure until each of the afore-
mentioned regularization terms stays stable (i.e., |R(k−1)t −R(k )t | < ϵ ,
where R(k )t is the value of the t th regularization term at the kth iter-
ation). As we will demonstrate in Section § 5, our hyperparameter
augmentation mechanism enables a stable detection result when
each hyperparameter is initialized within a certain range.
5 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed tech-
nique by answering the following questions. (1) Does the effective-
ness of TABOR vary when the size, position, and shape of trojan
backdoors change? (2) Does the dimensionality of the input space
tied to a target model influence the effectiveness of TABOR? (3) How
effectively does TABOR demonstrate when there are multiple trig-
gers inserted into target models? (4) Does the complexity of the
target model influence the effect of trojan backdoor detection? (5)
How sensitive is TABOR to the hyperparameters? (6) How effec-
tive is TABOR for different methods of inserting a trojan backdoor?
(7) In comparison with the state-of-the-art technique – Neural
Cleanse [48], how well does TABOR perform trojan detection and
trigger restoration under the settings above? In the following, we
first describe the design and setup of our experiments. Then, we
specify the datasets involved in our experiments as well as the
evaluation metrics we use for our experiments. Finally, we show
and discuss our experiment results.
5.1 Experiment Design and Setup
To answer the questions above, we design a series of experiments,
each of which answers a subset of these questions.
To answer the question (1), (2) and (7), we first selected two
datasets GTSRB and ImageNet, on which we trained many neural
networks with the architectures of 6 Conv+2 MaxPooling CNN
for GTSRB and VGG16 [38] for ImageNet (see Appendix for more
details as well as other hyperparameters). In this way, we could
obtain two sets of learning models, each of which takes inputs in a
unique dimensionality (32 × 32 × 3 for GTSRB and 224 × 224 × 3
for ImageNet). With these models in hand, we then contaminated
these networks by using the trojan insertion approach BadNet [18].
BadNet implants a trojan backdoor into a target model, and the
trigger tied to the inserted trojan is active only if a small, fixed-size
trigger is present at the exact position of an image. With such a
trojan backdoor, the target model misclassifies a trigger-attached
image into the target class No.33 for models pertaining GTSRB
and the target class No.1 for models pertaining to ImageNet. In this
experiment, we adjust the size, shape and position of a trigger when
using BadNet to train victim models4. Figure 4 showcases some
4The details about the shape, location, and size of each implanted trigger are shown in
Table 1. It should be noted that we used square trojans with different colors (i.e., white
for GTSRB and black for ImageNet) for different datasets to test the robustness of the
detection approaches to trojan colors.
7
Victim Model Cat Cat Cat CatVictim Model Victim Model Victim Model
Figure 4: The demonstrations of the victim models that are trained on ImageNet dataset and are infected by the triggers with
different shapes, locations and sizes.
learning models that misclassify an image only when the corre-
sponding trigger is present in that image. In this work, we utilized
TABOR and Neural Cleanse to detect trojan backdoors in victim
models. In addition, we used both approaches to examine backdoor
existence against clean models that have not been implanted with
any trojan backdoors.
Victim Model
Bird Cat Fish
(a) Misclassifying into the same   
     target class 
Victim Model
Bird Cat Cat
 (b) Misclassifying into different 
       target classes 
Figure 5: An example illustrating the effect of the two trojan
backdoors upon the classification results.
To answer the question (3) and (7), we trained the same neu-
ral networks on the aforementioned datasets and used BadNet to
contaminate these networks. Differently, we, however, followed
two alternative approaches to insert trojan backdoors into target
models. For the first approach, we implant two backdoors into a
single neural network. One backdoor is used for misclassifying
an image (with the corresponding trigger A present) into a target
class A. The other is used for mistakenly categorizing that image
(with a different trigger B present) into another target class B. For
the second approach, we also implant two trojans into one single
model. Similar to the first approach, in order to trigger the back-
doors, one needs to present different triggers to the infected model.
However, different from the first approach, both backdoors are used
to misclassify a trigger-inserted image into a single target class. In
Figure 5, we show a simple example, demonstrating the effect of
the backdoors upon classification results.
To answer the question (4) and (7), in addition to training the
same neural networks on the aforementioned two datasets, we
trained learningmodels withmore complicated neural architectures.
To be specific, we trained 10 Conv + 5 MaxPooling on GTSRB and
ResNet [21] on ImageNet (see Appendix for more details as well
as other hyperparameters). Similar to the setup above, we also
inserted trojan backdoors (i.e., square trigger located at the bottom
right with size 8 × 8 for GTSRB and firefox trigger located at top
right with size 40 × 40 for ImageNet) to these trained models using
BadNet and generate victim models. We again applied TABOR and
Neural Cleanse to these victim learning models. In this way, we
can compare their performance accordingly.
To answer the question (5) and (7), we first trained one neural
network with the architectures of 6 Conv + 2 MaxPooling CNN on
GTSRB. Then, we inserted a trojan backdoor (i.e., square trigger
located at the bottom right with size 8 × 8) into the model using
BadNet. Again, we used both TABOR and Neural Cleanse to iden-
tify the existence of a trojan backdoor. But, instead of using the
optimal hyperparameters manually identified (see details in Ap-
pendix), we subtly varied the corresponding hyperparameters for
both techniques and observed the changes in their detection results.
To be specific, for TABOR, we selected two values for each of the
hyperparameters λ1 ∼ λ6 and then test all of their combinations.
For Neural Cleanse, we selected four values for its only tunable
hyperparameter (i.e., the weight of the penalty term that controls
the size of the trigger). In Appendix, we list all the hyperparameters
selected.
As is mentioned in Section §2, an alternative approach to implant-
ing a trojan backdoor is Trojan Attack proposed in [29]. Therefore,
we answer the question (6) and (7) as follows. First, we trained a
neural network model using the dataset LFW because LFW is the
dataset selected by Neural Cleanse to demonstrate its defense
against the Trojan Attack. With this clean model in hand, we then
implanted a trojan backdoor to the model and thus generated the
victim model using Trojan Attack [29] under its default setting [48].
Similar to other experiment designs above, in order to respond
to question (7), we applied both TABOR and Neural Cleanse to
examine the existence of trojan backdoors against the victim model
and compared their performance in trojan detection.
5.2 Datasets and Evaluation Metrics
The aforementioned experiments involve three datasets and we
trained different neural architectures on these datasets. As a result,
we first introduce these datasets. Since our designed experiments
also involve the comparison between detection techniques, we fur-
ther introduce the evaluation metrics for performance comparison.
5.2.1 Datasets and Neural Architectures. LFW. Labeled Faces
in the Wild [24] (LFW) is a database of face photographs with the
dimensionality of 224×224×3 designed for studying the problem of
unconstrained face recognition. In this work, we follow the default
setting of [29] and sample a subset of 2,622 samples, where each
sample belongs to a distinct class.
GTSRB. German Traffic Sign Recognition Dataset [40] (GTSRB)
contains photos of traffic signs, which can be partitioned into 39,209
training and 12,630 testing samples. In this dataset, the photos of
traffic signs have the dimensionality of 32× 32× 3, and they can be
categorized into 43 distinct classes.
ImageNet. ImageNet [11] is one of the most widely used datasets
for object classification and recognition. The whole dataset contains
more than 14 million images across 20,000+ categories, in which
each image has the dimensionality of 224 × 224 × 3. In this work,
we use a subset of 50 class, where each class has 400 samples.
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5.2.2 Evaluation Metrics. We introduce 2 sets of metrics, which
measure the fidelity of the restored trigger as well as the correctness
of backdoor detection. Here, we provide their definition below.
Fidelity measure. Recall that a trojan detection approach needs
to restore and visualize a trojan backdoor so that a security analyst
could manually examine the reported trojan backdoor and then
take further actions (e.g., patching victim models). As a result, we
define three fidelity measures – precision, recall and F1 score – to
quantify the quality of the restored backdoor.
Given a trojan backdoor restored (i.e., resorted trigger pertaining
to the backdoor), the three measures are defined as follows.
precision = ∥M ⊙ Mt ∥1∥M∥1 , recall =
∥M ⊙ Mt ∥1
∥Mt ∥1 ,
F1 = 2 · precision · recallprecision + recall .
(9)
Here, M and Mt represent the mask of the trigger restored and that
of the ground-truth trigger, respectively. ∥ · ∥1 denotes the L1 norm.
As we can see from the definition , the precision measure specifies
the percentage of the restored trigger area truly overlapping with
the ground-truth trigger area, whereas the recall measure describes
the percentage of the ground-truth area correctly restored by a
detection approach. F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and
recall, and thus describes the overall quality of a restored trojan
backdoor. It is not difficult to note that the higher these measures
are, the better fidelity a restored trojan backdoor exhibits.
Correctness measure. This measure indicates the correctness
of a trojan detection approach. In this work, we use 4 different
symbols to represent its values –  (success detection), H# (success
detection with errors), ⊖ (incorrect trojan detection) and# (failure
detection).
Given a learningmodel, indicates two situations. First, it means
a detection approach could successfully pinpoint the trojan back-
doors intentionally implanted in an infected model, and does not
mistakenly report the existence of additional trojan backdoors ca-
pable of misclassifying a trigger-inserted image into an uninfected
class. Second, for a clean learning model without a trojan backdoor
implanted, it indicates a detection approach correctly asserts the
nonexistence of backdoors.
Similar to  , H# also represents the successful identification of
a trojan backdoor intentionally inserted. Differently, it, however,
indicates a situation where a detection approach also mistakenly
pinpoints the existence of additional backdoors. For example, a
trojan backdoor is inserted into a victim learning model, which
misclassifies a trigger-inserted image into target class A. Using
a trojan detection approach, we can successfully determine the
existence of a trojan backdoor misleading prediction results to the
target class A. But, along with this correct identification, it also
falsely reports an additional trojan which misclassifies a trigger-
inserted image into an uninfected class B.
With respect to ⊖, it means that, given a learning model with a
backdoor inserted, a detection approach reports the existence of a
backdoor. However, different from the situations above, it fails to
tie the detected trojan backdoor to the correct infected class. Again,
take the aforementioned case for example. Using a trojan detection
approach with the correctness of⊖, we deem a learning model con-
tains a backdoor or, in other words, track down an incorrect trojan
backdoor, not the one intentionally inserted. Unfortunately, we,
however, cannot correctly identify the trojan backdoor pertaining
to the target class A. Regarding #, it simply indicates a detection
approach (1) fails to deem a victim learning model contains a tro-
jan backdoor intentionally inserted or (2) mistakenly reports the
existence of backdoor when the model is actually clean, carrying
no trojan backdoors.
As is discussed in Section § 2, given a learning model, a model
user needs a technical approach to ❶ correctly assert the (non-
)existence of a manufactured trojan backdoor and ❷ – if a trojan
exists – restore the corresponding trigger in a high-fidelity fashion.
With a technique like this in hand, she could manually examine a
learning model and take actions accordingly. As a result, a trojan
detection approach is more favorable if its detection correctness is
marked as  or H#. On the contrary, a detection approach is less
useful if its correctness is marked as⊖ or#. This is simply because# implies the complete failure of a detection approach whereas ⊖
indicates a false detection which might mislead a security analyst
into taking wrong actions.
5.3 Experiment Results
In the following, we show and summarize the experiment results.
In addition, we discuss and analyze the reasons for our findings.
Real Trigger Incorrect Triggers
(a) Neural Cleanse.
Real Trigger Incorrect Triggers
(b) TABOR.
Figure 6: Real triggers & incorrect triggers detected by
Neural Cleanse and TABOR in ImageNet. Note that for bet-
ter visualization quality, we reverse the color of the restored
trojans from ImageNet dataset.
5.3.1 Primary Experiment Results. In Table 1, we show some
of the comparison results. They indicate the performance of our
technique as well as that of Neural Cleanse observed at the situ-
ations where we change the size, shape, and position of a trigger
pertaining to a trojan backdoor.
As we can observe from Table 1, for learning models that enclose
a trojan backdoor with a different size, in a different shape or at a
different location, Neural Cleanse oftentimes cannot point out the
trojan existence (indicated by the symbol #). Even if it sometimes
points out trojan existence, in one of the cases, it fails to pinpoint the
trigger truly inserted (indicated by the symbol⊖). For a clean model
carrying no trojan backdoor, we also discover Neural Cleanse
mistakenly reports the model is implanted with a trojan backdoor
(represented by symbol #). There are two major reasons behind
these results.
First, as is discussed in Section §4, a trigger pertaining to a
trojan backdoor is a special adversarial sample. In [48], Wang
et al. designed Neural Cleanse to search that trigger in a specific
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Shape Position Size
Fidelity Measure Correctness Measure
Precision Recall F1 NCleanse
TABORNCleanse TABOR NCleanse TABOR NCleanse TABOR
Clean N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A #  
Victim
model
White
Square
Top
Left
6 × 6 0.449 1.000 0.611 0.426 0.518 0.597   
8 × 8 0.544 0.964 0.672 0.703 0.601 0.813 #  
10 × 10 0.718 1.000 0.518 0.580 0.596 0.734 #  
12 × 12 0.540 1.000 0.375 0.431 0.443 0.602 #  
14 × 14 0.561 0.816 0.281 0.980 0.374 0.890 #  
Bottom
Right
6 × 6 0.186 0.870 0.750 0.972 0.298 0.918 #  
8 × 8 0.578 0.948 0.578 0.984 0.578 0.966 # H#
10 × 10 0.671 0.966 0.530 0.770 0.592 0.857 # H#
12 × 12 0.643 0.983 0.500 0.500 0.563 0.663 #  
14 × 14 0.812 0.980 0.571 0.541 0.671 0.697 # H#
Firefox
Logo
Top
Right
6 × 6 0.458 1.000 0.177 0.452 0.256 0.622 #  
8 × 8 0.448 1.000 0.732 0.285 0.556 0.443 ⊖ H#
10 × 10 0.882 0.971 0.233 0.337 0.369 0.500 H# H#
12 × 12 0.963 0.667 0.193 0.274 0.321 0.388 H# H#
14 × 14 0.477 1.000 0.425 0.275 0.450 0.432 # H#
Bottom
Left
6 × 6 0.052 0.952 0.210 0.355 0.083 0.517 # H#
8 × 8 0.974 0.958 0.309 0.398 0.461 0.563 H# H#
10 × 10 0.493 0.873 0.575 0.518 0.531 0.650 # H#
12 × 12 0.871 0.963 0.300 0.393 0.446 0.558 #  
14 × 14 0.600 0.554 0.144 0.262 0.232 0.356 H# H#
(a) Trojan Fidelity and End-to-end Detection Results on GTSRB.
Shape Position Size
Fidelity Measure Correctness Measure
Precision Recall F1 NCleanse
TABORNCleanse TABOR NCleanse TABOR NCleanse TABOR
Clean N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A   
Victim
model
Black
Square
Top
Left
20 × 20 1.000 0.852 0.068 0.448 0.126 0.587 #  
40 × 40 0.598 0.889 0.033 0.309 0.616 0.459 # H#
60 × 60 0.670 0.997 0.043 0.932 0.080 0.963  H#
80 × 80 0.811 1.000 0.047 0.663 0.089 0.797 # H#
100 × 100 1.000 0.648 0.038 0.411 0.073 0.503 # H#
Bottom
Right
20 × 20 0.394 1.000 0.033 0.285 0.060 0.444 # H#
40 × 40 0.731 0.895 0.066 0.323 0.121 0.475 # H#
60 × 60 0.228 0.766 0.026 0.931 0.047 0.841 # H#
80 × 80 0.458 1.000 0.023 0.552 0.044 0.711 # H#
100 × 100 0.000 0.913 0.000 0.438 NaN 0.592 # H#
Firefox
Logo
Top
Right
20 × 20 0.061 0.398 0.011 0.168 0.019 0.237 # H#
40 × 40 0.664 0.752 0.072 0.197 0.129 0.313 #  
60 × 60 0.898 0.779 0.082 0.118 0.150 0.205  H#
80 × 80 0.312 0.774 0.037 0.141 0.066 0.238 # H#
100 × 100 0.902 0.925 0.056 0.105 0.106 0.189 # H#
Bottom
Left
20 × 20 1.000 0.048 0.135 0.011 0.239 0.018 # H#
40 × 40 0.600 0.917 0.046 0.271 0.086 0.418 #  
60 × 60 0.803 0.929 0.081 0.147 0.147 0.254 # H#
80 × 80 0.000 0.889 0.000 0.044 NaN 0.083 # H#
100 × 100 0.000 0.951 0.000 0.089 NaN 0.163 #  
(b) Trojan Fidelity and End-to-end Detection Results on ImageNet.
Table 1: Performance comparison between Neural Cleanse, indicated by NCleanse and TABOR on Trojan Fidelity and End-to-end
Detection. Note that N/A stands for “Not- Available”. NaN represents “Not-A-Number”.
adversarial subspace under the guidance of an optimization objec-
tive. With the variation in trigger shapes, sizes and positions, the
adversarial subspace got varied. In different adversarial subspaces,
the total number of adversarial samples might vary, influencing the
stability of Neural Cleanse in trojan detection. Intuition suggests
the more adversarial samples there are in an adversarial space, the
less likely it will be for an optimization technique to pinpoint the
target trigger.
Second, regardless of whether a backdoor exists in a learning
model, the optimization-based technique could always find a local
optimal solution for a corresponding optimization problem and thus
deem it as a reasonably good local optimum (i.e., a trojan backdoor).
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In [48], Wang et al. proposes a technique to distinguish local optima
(incorrect triggers) from reasonably good local optima (implanted
trojan backdoors). Technically speaking, they design a distinguish-
ing metric and utilize a anomaly detection technique to determine
if a local optimum represents the trojan backdoor intentionally in-
serted. However, as we depict in Figure 6, the incorrect triggers, and
target backdoors have less distinguishability between each other
(i.e., both have relatively dense pixels grouping together).
GTSRB ImageNet
Label: 0 Label: 33 Label: 0 Label: 1
(a) Neural Cleanse.
GTSRB ImageNet
Label: 0 Label: 33 Label: 0 Label: 1
(b) TABOR.
Figure 7: Triggers detected under the settingwhere two back-
doors are tied to two different classes in one victimmodel. In
end-to-end detection, Neural Cleanse detects the trojanwith
some false positives on GTSRB, and reports three wrongly-
detected trojans on ImageNet. TABOR correctly reports the
trojaned label without any false positives on both datasets.
In comparison with the extremely poor performance Neural
Cleanse exhibits in the setting of trigger shape/size/location vari-
ations, our technique demonstrates a significant improvement in
trojan backdoor detection5. As is shown in Table 1 and Figure 6
(more examples of the restored triggers are shown in the Appen-
dix), for all settings, our technique could accurately point out the
existence or non-existence of a trojan backdoor, and the incorrect
triggers and target backdoors have more obvious distinguishability.
On the one hand, this is because our design reduces the adversarial
subspace which eases the search of triggers intentionally inserted.
On the other hand, this is due to the fact that our technique in-
tegrates a more effective anomaly detection mechanism (i.e., the
new metric designed in §4) which could distinguish triggers from
incorrect triggers. From Table 1, we also note that, given a learning
model with one implanted backdoor, our technique typically iden-
tifies additional trojan backdoors pertaining to non-target classes.
However, as is discussed in Section §5.2.2, these false identifications
do not jeopardize the effectiveness of our proposed technique be-
cause (1) the most important goal of this work is to determine the
existence of the trojan backdoor (defined in Section §2), and our
approach can always pinpoint the trojan intentionally inserted and
does not falsely report the trojan existence for clean learning mod-
els. (2) these false identifications do not influence further patching
5Table 1 demonstrates that both approaches are relatively robust to trojan colors.
GTSRB ImageNet
1st detection 1st detection
(a) Neural Cleanse.
GTSRB ImageNet
1st detection 1st detection2nd detection
(b) TABOR.
Figure 8: Triggers detected under the settingwhere two back-
doors are tied to one class in one victim model.
actions in that an infected model will be patched using the correct
trigger, and patching additional non-intentionally inserted trojans
does not affect the accuracy of the patched model.
Going beyond the performance comparison from the perspective
of detection correctness, we also show the performance of our
approach from the fidelity aspect. As is illustrated in Table 1, overall,
our approach demonstrates higher measures in precision, recall,
and F-score than Neural Cleanse. This indicates our approach
could restore a trojan backdoor (i.e., the trigger pertaining to the
backdoor) with higher fidelity. As is discussed in Section §2, this
capability is critical because it could better facilitate a model user
to examine trojan existence and thus take actions.
Last, as is shown in Table 1, while we perform trojan detection
on learning models taking input in different dimensionalities (Ima-
geNet with 224 × 224 and GTSRB with 32 × 32), for both Neural
Cleanse and our approach, the difference in input dimensionality
has less impact upon their backdoor detection. This indicates that
we can expect consistent detection performance if we utilize these
approaches to detect trojan backdoors against models trained on
other data sets with different input dimensionalities.
5.3.2 Other Experiment Results. As is mentioned above, we also
design an experiment inserting two backdoors into one single vic-
tim learning model and tying them to different target classes. In
Figure 7, we show the experiment results observed under this set-
ting. As we can observe from Figure 7b, our technique could not
only successfully point out the existence of both trojan backdoors
but accurately tie them to the correct target labels as well. In con-
trast, Neural Cleanse either fails to point out the existence of
trojan backdoor (for GTSRB) or only deems incorrect trojans as
true backdoors (for ImageNet). We believe this observation results
from the fact that our technique not only shrinks the adversarial
subspace to better resolve the true injected trojans but also inte-
grates a better anomaly detection metric than Neural Cleanse
to distinguish falsely identified backdoors (i.e., incorrect triggers)
from the true backdoors.
In addition to showing the performance under the situation
where two backdoors are inserted and tied to two different classes,
Figure 8 illustrates the experimental results obtained from the al-
ternative setting where two backdoors are inserted and attached
to the same class. As we can observe from Figure 8a and 8b, both
Neural Cleanse and our approach point out the existence of tro-
jan backdoors. However, as is depicted in Figure 8, both of these
approaches can only restore the trigger tied to one trojan backdoor
but fail to recover the trigger tied to the other. We believe this is pre-
sumably because in the adversarial subspace one backdoor is easier
to be identified than the other when we perform a search under the
guidance of an objective function. While this might influence an
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(a) Neural Cleanse. (b) TABOR.
Figure 9: Triggers detected under the same setting using different hyperparameters.
GTSRB ImageNet 
Shallow Net Deep Net Shallow Net Deep Net
LFW 
Trojan Attack
(a) Neural Cleanse.
GTSRB ImageNet LFW 
Shallow Net Deep Net Shallow Net Deep Net Trojan Attack
(b) TABOR.
Figure 10: Triggers detected under the alternative settings.
The correctness measure results of the deep nets are consis-
tent with those of the shallow networks shown in Table 1. In
end-to-end detection, both Neural Cleanse and TABOR man-
age to detect the correct trigger without any false positives.
Note that we also reverse the color of the restored triggers
from LFW dataset.
analyst to examine the backdoor and maybe patch both triggers,
it does not harm the effectiveness of both detection approaches in
pointing out the existence of trojan backdoors.
In this work, we have utilized the unlearning method introduced
in [48] to patch the victim model with the expectation of seeing
the successful restoration of the other trigger. In Figure 8, we show
this result. As we can observe, after patching the backdoor iden-
tified by both approaches and then applying both approaches to
the patched models, Neural Cleanse still fails to find the missing
triggers. However, we surprisingly find our approach could accu-
rately pinpoint the missing trigger for the model originally trained
on GTSRB but fails to identify the missing trigger pertaining to
the model originally trained on ImageNet. This indicates that for
low dimensional inputs, restoring a high fidelity trigger is enough
for patching the infected model even simply applying unlearning.
However, for high dimensional inputs, we may need both a high
fidelity restored trigger and an advanced patching method to patch
an infected model due to the extremely large adversarial subspace
of high dimensional inputs.
In addition to the aforementioned observations, we discover that,
in both of the settings above, our technique always restores trojan
backdoors with higher fidelity than Neural Cleanse (see Figure 8).
This observation aligns with our experiment results observed in the
experiment above and implies that our approach could potentially
provide an analyst with better capability in manually examining
trojan backdoors and thus better patching a victim learning model.
As is described in Section §4, both our technique and Neural
Cleanse formalize trojan detection as an optimization problem. In
order to solve the optimization problem, objective functions are
defined. In these objective functions, both our technique and Neural
Cleanse introduce multiple hyperparameters – 6 hyperparameters
for our approach and 1 hyperparameter for Neural Cleanse. In
Figure 9a and 9b, we illustrate some triggers restored under different
hyperparameters. As we can observe, for our proposed technique
and Neural Cleanse, the subtle variation in hyperparameters has
nearly no influence upon the trojan detection. This is because both
approaches adopt the hyperparameter augmentation introduced in
Section §4. The results indicate we can expect the stable detection
accuracy and restoration fidelity even if the hyperparameters are
subtly varied. This is a critical characteristic because model users
do not need to overly worry to set very precise hyperparameters
in order to obtain the optimal detection performance.
The experiment results discussed above are all collected from
the settings where the learning models are trained with relatively
shallow neural architectures and the trojan backdoors are inserted
through a relatively simple method (i.e., BadNet). In Figure 10, we
show experimental results gathered from alternative settings.
First, we can observe, when a victim model encloses a trojan
backdoor inserted by a more advanced attack technique, both our
approach and Neural Cleanse could correctly identify the exis-
tence of a trojan backdoor and tie it to the right target class without
mistakenly reporting additional backdoors. This indicates both ap-
proaches are robust against the way to implant trojan backdoors.
However, we also note the trigger restored by both approaches
have a relatively low fidelity compared to the trigger restored from
the BadNet attack. We believe this is because the trigger inserted by
Trojan Attack [29] has a higher complexity and, through the opti-
mization objective designed by both approaches, it is more difficult
to completely recover the trigger intentionally inserted.
Second, we can observe, when victim models are trained with
a more complicated architecture, both our approach and Neural
Cleanse could correctly pinpoint the existence of trojan backdoors.
This indicates that the complexity of target models does not influ-
ence the detection correctness, although more complicated learning
models imply a more complicated search space, making trigger
search more difficult. With this observation, we can conclude the
performance variation of both approaches is not strongly tied to
the change of model complexity.
6 CONCLUSION
Given a target learning model, this work shows that, even for the
state-of-the-art trojan backdoor detection technique, it is still dif-
ficult to accurately point out the existence of a trojan backdoor
without false alarms or failure identification, particularly when
the trigger size, shape, and its presentation location vary. Inspired
by this, we propose a new technical approach. Technically, it first
formalizes the detection of trojan backdoors as an optimization
problem and identifies a set of candidate triggers by resolving this
optimization problem. Then, it defines a new measure to quantify
these candidate triggers and uses an anomaly detection approach
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to distinguish real triggers from incorrect triggers in an infected
model and eliminate false alarms in an clean model. Following this
design, we implement TABOR and show that our technical approach
can not only accurately point out the existence of trojan backdoors
but more importantly restore the presentation of trojan backdoors.
Thus, we conclude that an optimization-based technical approach
can significantly escalate the accuracy of trojan backdoor detection
and improve the fidelity of the resorted backdoors.
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A COMPLETE OPTIMIZATION FUNCTION
Putting Equation (1) and four regularization terms introduced in
Section §4 together, the proposed optimization objective function
is as following:
argmin
n∑
i=1
L(xi ,M,∆) + R1 + R2 + R3 + R4, (10)
where
L(xi ,M,∆) = L(f (xi ⊙ (1 − M) + M ⊙ ∆),yt ) ,
R1(M,∆) = λ1 · Relastic(M) + λ2 · Relastic(∆′) ,
R2(M,∆) = λ3 · Rsmooth(M) + λ4 · Rsmooth(∆′) ,
R3(M,∆, xi ) = λ5 · L(f (xi ⊙ (1 − M)),yt ′i ) ,
R4(M,∆) = λ6 · L(f (M ⊙ ∆,yt ) , ∆′ = (1 − M) ⊙ ∆ ,
(11)
in which yt ′i is the original label of xi . Relastic(·) and Rsmooth(·)
indicates the elastic-net and the smoothness regularization.
Neural Cleanse λ1
1 × e−1, 1 × e−3,
1 × e−5, 1 × e−7
TABOR
λ1 1 × e−3, 1 × e−5
λ2 1 × e−4, 1 × e−6
λ3 1 × e−5, 1 × e−7
λ4 1 × e−6, 1 × e−8
λ5 1 × e−4, 1 × e−6
λ6 1 × e−2, 1 × e−4
Table 2: The values of each hyperparameters in hyperparam-
eters sensitivity experiments.
B HYPERPARAMETERS
Here Table 3 are all the hyperparameters of TABOR we used in
our experiments. It should be noted ImageNet and LFW share the
same set of hyperparameters. We also exhibit all the selected values
of each hyperparameters used in the hyperparameter sensitivity
experiments in Table 2.
Hyperparameters GTSRB ImageNet & LFW
#Epochs 500 500
Learning Rate 1 × e−3 1 × e−3
Optimizor Adam Adam
Mask Regularizor elastic net elastic net
Delta Regularizor elasetic net l1
λ1 1 × e−6 1 × e−3
λ2 1 × e−5 1 × e−5
λ3 1 × e−7 1 × e−6
λ4 1 × e−8 1 × e−9
λ5 1 × e−6 1 × e−6
λ6 1 × e−2 1 × e−2
Table 3: The values of the hyperparameters used in our ex-
periments.
C MODEL ARCHITECTURES
There are 4 different model architectures mentioned in this pa-
per, 6 Conv + 2 MaxPooling CNN, 10 Conv + 5 MaxPooling CNN,
VGG16 [38] and ResNet50 [21]. The architecture of 6 Conv + 2
MaxPooling CNN, 10 Conv + 5 MaxPooling CNN are shown in
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Figure 11: Model Architecture of 6 Conv + 2 MaxPooling
Convolutional Neural Network.
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Figure 12: Model Architecture of 10 Conv + 5 MaxPooling
Convolutional Neural Network.
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Figure 13: Model Architecture of VGG16.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 respectively. The convolutional layers in
these two networks have kernels with size 3 × 3 and the pool size
of MaxPooling layers is 2 × 2. Figure 13 shows the architecture of
VGG16. We refer interested readers to [38] for detailed information.
The architecture of ResNet50 is too large so we do not include the
complete structure here. We refer interested readers to this paper
[21] for a detailed description and diagram of ResNet50.
D VISUAL RESULTS
We first show the rest of the results in hyperparameter sensitivity
experiments in Figure 14. We then include all the originally injected
triggers and the triggers detected in the target labels using Neural
Cleanse or TABOR in Table 4, 5, and 6.
Original trigger Neural Cleanse TABOR
Table 4: Original triggers and restored triggers on LFW.
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Figure 14: The rest results of hyperparameter sensitivity experiments.
Shape Position 6 × 6 8 × 8 10 × 10 12 × 12 14 × 14
Square
Top
Left
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Bottom
Right
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Firefox
Top
Right
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Bottom
Left
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Table 5: Original triggers and restored triggers on GTSRB.
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Shape Position 20 × 20 40 × 40 60 × 60 80 × 80 100 × 100
Square
Top
Left
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Bottom
Right
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Firefox
Top
Right
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Bottom
Left
Original
trigger
Neural Cleanse
TABOR
Table 6: Original triggers and restored triggers on ImageNet.
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